Deborah Ralston, Robert Turnbull | businessspectator.com.au | 10:43 AM, 15 May 2009
Over the course of 2008 the number of businesses entering external administration rose from 372 in January to 813 December, as the economy reeled under the impact of the Global Financial Crisis.
The causes of business failures in a buoyant economy can be internal weaknesses such as poor management (43 per cent), cash flow problems (40 per cent) and trading losses (34 per cent) (ASIC, 2007). Business failures can merely reflect markets operating effectively to weed out uncompetitive players.
However, in a recession business failure can be due to external factors such as the unavailability of finance to rollover debt, unanticipated falls in market demand, increases in bad debts and the domino effect of business failures in trading partners.
Business failures impose social and economic costs on other businesses, communities, employees and government and accelerate an economic downturn. Consequently, the public interest is served by insolvency laws that maximise the opportunity to preserve potentially viable businesses during a downturn.
Recognising this need, in 1992 law reforms were introduced that established the voluntary administration procedures and Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA). The aims were to maximise(s) the chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business, continuing in existence; and to achieve a better result for creditors and members than an immediate winding up of the company. (s.435A, Corporations Act).
While the intent is clear, few companies survive administration and even fewer go on to enter into a DOCA. The process is more often only a means of processing competing creditor claims than a means to achieve a business turnaround.
Indeed, data from Restructuring Works indicates that since 1999, of the 67,000 companies that have entered some form of insolvency administration only around 10 per cent managed to execute a DOCA. During 2008, that percentage dropped to only 6 per cent, suggesting that the administration process had become little more than a precursor to a formal creditors’ winding-up.
With a rising rate of business failure, urgent action is needed to ensure that the administration and DOCA processes deliver on the spirit and intention of the legislation.
So, where is it going wrong? There are five key issues.
First, under Australian law it is an offence to engage in insolvent trading. Directors are obliged to appoint administrators if they consider the firm is or may become insolvent. Directors may become personally liable for debts incurred if the firm trades while it is insolvent.
Other countries are more flexible. In the UK, for instance, directors will only be liable if they ought to have concluded there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation and if they did not take steps to minimise potential loss to creditors. This provides UK directors with more latitude to attempt a management-led business recovery and better protection when doing so.
Directors in the United States are also unlikely to be held liable if they have acted with due diligence and in the belief that the company can be turned around. Germany, one of the only countries which have similarly inflexible laws to Australia, has suspended them recently partly due to the impact of the financial crisis.
Second, the appointment of an administrator immediately triggers default terminations of most contracts, including credit facilities. Temporary moratoriums that constrain secured creditors from enforcing their charges and landlords from exercising rights under their leases are too limited to facilitate a business turnaround or recovery-focussed administration.
Consequently, the appointment of an administrator results in an immediate loss of confidence in the business. This is specifically what the 1992 reforms were intended to avoid. Administration also commonly precipitates the appointment of receivers by secured creditors to recover debts from the assets subject to any charge.
Third, the premise of our insolvency laws is that the incumbent management should be replaced by external administrators. This approach may reflect Australia’s colourful history of high profile business failures and occasional rogue behaviour by directors and others.
However, rogue conduct should not colour all cases. From the perspective of creditors and shareholders seeking to preserve the value of their investment, immediately removing existing directors or management may not always deliver the best outcomes. If business recovery is the primary objective, the liability of directors may need to be considered separately from the question of their continuing involvement in the recovery or turnaround process.
The fourth issue is that the DOCA process only deals effectively with unsecured creditors claims and does not ordinarily bind secured creditors, which presents two difficulties. First, secured creditors who exercise priority claims over company assets can recover their debt by disposing of secured assets, denuding the going concern, and leaving little or no residual value for other creditors or shareholders. Second, because most companies have a mix of secured and unsecured debt they end up incurring the costs of both the bank’s receivership and the administrator.
Where to from here? When the DOCA reforms were enacted, scant consideration was given to the merits of constraining the rights of secured creditors in favour of a system focussed on business recovery and turnaround in the interests of all stakeholders.
Amendments to the Corporations Act introduced in December 2007 to improve processes and increase efficiency, do little to address this fundamental problem.
In 2003 the Inquiry into Australia’s Insolvency Laws re-examined the issues and reconsidered the possible establishment of a system based on the United States’ Chapter 11 process. It concluded that a US-style system was not desirable in Australia as it is administered through the courts and places business decisions in the hands of the judiciary, thereby being both costly and time-consuming. These fears, together with concerns about debtors remaining in control of the business, make a Chapter 11 process unpopular in Australia.
It is time to take a fresh look at what is required to reduce the social and economic impact of business failure and bring us into step with international best practice. A system that presents a more effective and efficient approach to business recovery and turnaround is required if the aim is to maximise the chances of maintaining companies as going concerns.
Deborah Ralston is Acting Director, Melbourne Centre for Financial Studies and Professor of Finance, Monash University
Robert Turnbull is Special Counsel, Macpherson + Kelley Lawyers and a member MCFS Industry Advisory Committee